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Abstract
This paper reports on a simulated phishing
experiment targeting 6,938 faculty and staff at
George Mason University. The study examined
various possible predictors of phishing susceptibility.
The focus of the present paper is on demographic
factors
(including
age,
gender
and
position/employment). Since previous studies of age
and gender have yielded discrepant results, one
purpose of the study was to disambiguate these
findings. A second purpose was to compare different
types of email phishing exploits. A third objective was
to compare the effect of different types of feedback
given to those who clicked on one or more of three
simulated phishing exploits that were deployed over a
three-week period. Our analysis of demographic
factors, effects of phishing email content, and effects
of repeated exposure to phishing exploits revealed
significant age effects, marginally significant gender
differences, and significant differences in email type.
A multi-level model estimated effects of multiple
variables simultaneously.

1. Introduction
Phishing attacks—social engineering exploits
using digital means—are unintentional insider threats
[6] that can result in serious financial impacts and/or
losses of confidential information. These exploits
cause grave damage to both commercial and US
government entities—such as the now infamous
cyber/phishing attack against the US Government
Office of Personnel Management that gave attackers
access to sensitive data on millions of government
employees and contractors. Phishing attacks targeted
on US organizations increased more than 40% in
2018 [12]; the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/64015
978-0-9981331-3-3
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

reported 2018 complaints amounting to losses of over
$1.2 billion for business email compromises, and,
more generally, $2.7 billion in Internet crime losses –
nearly twice the financial impact of 2017 [3].
Research on factors that affect people’s
susceptibility to phishing is an essential step in
improving cybersecurity awareness and designing
protective strategies. Research has revealed
numerous personal or demographic factors that are
related to phishing susceptibility [7]. However, there
is a lack of agreement among studies that differ in
methods and populations studied. A primary purpose
of this paper was to disambiguate some of the
discrepant findings on demographic factors
(particularly age and gender) and to compare effects
of different phishing email content on phishing
susceptibility. The study also examined possible
effects of different types of feedback given to those
who clicked on one or more of three simulated
phishing exploits that were deployed over a threeweek period.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews previous phishing susceptibility
studies; Section 3 presents the research questions for
this study; Section 4 describes the design of the
phishing study; Section 5 discusses the results of the
phishing susceptibility analysis; Section 6 discusses
the key findings, contributions and limitations of this
study; and Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. Related research
2.1. Previous phishing study results
A typical phishing study includes simulated
phishing campaigns, surveys, or both. Simulated
phishing attacks generally do not inform users that
they are participating in a phishing study. A study
may provide a warning of possible phishing exploits
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to evaluate the effectiveness of warnings. For
example, Mohebzada et al. [11] conducted two
phishing email experiments targeting 10,568 faculty,
staff and students at the American University of
Sharjah during the spring semester in 2010. They sent
out warning notifications after running 18 hours of
the campaign and found the warning messages were
largely ignored, suggesting that warnings may not be
sufficient to prevent users from falling for phishing.
Survey studies typically inform participants of the
study’s purpose before distributing the survey. For
example, Sheng et al. [13] recruited 1001 online
participants through Amazon.com’s Mechanical
Turk, who then answered survey questions and
completed a roleplay task; the study examined
demographic factors and the effectiveness of
different anti-phishing training materials.
Two recent phishing studies included both
experiments and surveys. In spring 2018, Diaz et al.
[1] launched a phishing email experiment to study
demographic factors related to phishing at the
University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC).
They sent out simulated phishing attacks targeting
1,350 undergraduate students who were not informed
before the experiment. A survey was sent after the
experiment to analyze some additional demographic
factors such as computer usage time and antiphishing training experience. Another recent example
is a study by Greene et al. [5], who launched three
phishing exercises (Mar, Aug, Dec) targeting
approximately 70 staff at the National Institute of
Standards and Technology. The purpose was to study
the reasons why email users were clicking or not
clicking on phishing links and attachments. They also
conducted three post-exercise surveys corresponding
to each phishing exploit and compared survey
responses between clickers and non-clickers.
Below we describe findings associated with
phishing and, as motivation and background for the
present study, point out several issues that may
contribute to discrepant or ambiguous results.

2.2. Factors related to phishing susceptibility
2.2.1. Gender. Inconsistent results have been
reported in previous studies of the relationship
between gender and phishing susceptibility. Jagatic et
al. [9], Sheng et al. [13], and Halevi et al. [8]
indicated that women were significantly more likely
to fall for phishing than men. In contrast, Mohebzada
et al. [11] found males and females were equally
likely to fall for the first phase of a phishing attack,
but more males (60.9%) were deceived in the second
phase of their phishing attack than females (39.1%).
Diaz et al. [1] found that 3% more males than

females clicked on the phishing email, although this
difference was not statistically significant. Further
study of gender effects is warranted to deconflict
these results.
2.2.2. Age. Inconsistent results have also been
reported on the association between age and phishing
susceptibility. Some key methodological differences
in relevant studies may account for this. In an online
survey and role-playing study involving a university
population, Sheng et al. [13] found that subjects in
the 18-25 age range were more likely to click on the
phishing emails than people in other age groups (2635, 36-45, 46-55, and over 55). In contrast, the
university study by Downs et al. [2] found no
significant association between age and behaviors
exhibited in their email role playing study, although
they found that younger people engaged in more
risky online activities. Their sample included students,
faculty and staff ranging from 18-45 years old.
Several other studies reported findings on age
factors that appear to differ from the above studies,
but there are important differences in how these
studies categorized age groups. In the Mohebzada et
al. [11] simulated phishing experiment targeting
university faculty, staff and students, no relationship
was found between “age” and phishing susceptibility-but the age range in this study was defined by
undergraduate level (freshman, sophomore, junior,
senior), with a “typical” age range from 18-21 years
old. Similarly, in the Jagatic et al. [9] phishing email
experiment conducted at Indiana University targeting
students aged 18-24 years old, younger users were
slightly more likely to be successfully phished. The
age categories in [11] and [9] correspond to the
lowest age category examined by Sheng et al. [13]
and Downs et al. [2], and therefore these results are
not necessarily inconsistent.
With regard to age effects, the evidence seems to
suggest that the younger age categories are more
susceptible to phishing than older age groups.
However, the discrepancies in methods and
populations studied, as well as possible confounding
factors that were not addressed (e.g. experience),
point to a need for a more careful study of age effects
that controls for possible confounding variables.
2.2.3. Phishing email content. Previous research
indicates that the address of the sender and email
content affect user response to email. Furnell [4]
indicates that content characteristics, such as visual
factors (logos and banners) may entice people to
click on a phishing email. Jagatic et al. [9] suggest
that a sender address from the university domain
lowers students’ guard. Greene et al. [5] argue that
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the alignment of user context and the phishing attack
premise is a significant factor in phishing
susceptibility. Vishwanath et al. [14] found the level
of attention to urgency cues or to email subject lines
significantly affects clicking response to phishing
emails; however, levels of attention to grammar or
spelling were significantly less likely to affect users
being phished. The importance of visual and other
cues is clearly a topic for further investigation.
2.2.4. Feedback type. A limited amount of research
has been directed toward the impact of previous
experience with phishing. Sheng et al. [13] reported
that their survey participants who had previous antiphishing training experience were less likely to fall
for phishing attacks. Effects of feedback or learning
effects may be studied in surveys, through selfreporting, or they may be examined in more
longitudinal approaches that determine if prior
exposure to phishing impacts future behavior. This is
one of the questions addressed in the present study.

3. Research questions
As we noted in the previous section, the various
studies relating to demographic (and some
contextual) factors have yielded somewhat
inconsistent results. A more complete list of relevant
research topics ([6], [7]) includes the effects of
demographics factors, email content/visual cues,
previous experience with phishing, level of
sophistication in using computers or internet
experience, and human behavioral/psychological
factors. The study reported here examined each of
these topics to some degree, but the present paper
focuses on the first three research needs; findings
relating to the other topics will be reported in future
papers. Thus, the present paper reports on the
following research questions:
Research Question 1: Will the experience of
succumbing to a phishing email and subsequent
feedback impact future behavior? We ask if users
who obtain explanatory feedback after clicking on a
phishing email will be less likely to click on a
phishing email in the future, and whether the nature
of the feedback (a brief message or a video landing
page) will affect the likelihood of succumbing to a
subsequent phishing attack.
Research Question 2: Regarding effects of
demographic factors,
(a) will there be differences in susceptibility to
phishing (as measured by likelihood of clicking

on a phishing email) based on age? We are
particularly interested in whether there will be
significant age effects, after statistically
adjusting for other possible factors.
(b) will there be gender effects? We suspect that the
effect of gender will be minimal, if at all. We do
not expect to find large differences in clicking
behavior in response to phishing emails, after
statistically adjusting for other possible factors.
(c) will there be differences in susceptibility to
phishing based on employment category
(position/department)? We are particularly
interested in the nature of this possible effect,
after statistically adjusting for other factors.
Research Question 3: Will the content of phishing
emails (source of message, visual cues) impact the
likelihood of responding to the exploit? Previous
research suggests that certain characteristics of a
phishing email may affect clicking behavior (e.g.,
[5]). We focus on the type or source (IT/tech support,
package delivery, credit card warning) that presents
different message content or context. Since the IT
tech support context may be more relevant to users,
we expect that more users will click on the IT tech
support email than the other two types of email.

4. Method
We designed and conducted an experimental
study targeting 6,938 faculty and staff at George
Mason University to identify the characteristics of
users who are susceptible to phishing. We distributed
three simulated phishing emails over a period of three
weeks, from October 30 to November 21 of 2018.
Study weeks started on Tuesdays and ended on
Mondays. All data in this study was de-identified to
protect personally identifiable information [10].
Our experimental design included varying types
of simulated email scams: one related to IT/tech
support, one related to finance/banking, and one
related to e-commerce/package delivery. This
allowed us to examine possible differences in
vulnerability across these phishing email types. Users
in our study received three different phishing emails
– IT/help desk (IT), Package Delivery (PD), and
Credit Card Warning (CC)-- each in a different week
and on a different day of the week. People who
clicked on the simulated phishing link were taken to a
randomly chosen landing page (LP). Three different
LPs were designed: a “page not found,” a brief
message informing users that the email was part of a
phishing study, and a similar message with a short
anti-phishing training video. In addition to the
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simulated phishing attack, we collected Human
Resource (HR) data to enable an analysis of
demographic factors.
Prior to initiating the campaign, the university
administration required that a pre-phish email be sent
notifying users that they may receive email messages
as part of a phishing test. This email also cautioned
users against clicking links or visiting URLs if a
message is suspected to be a phish. Because there
was no warning on individual phishing emails, the
IRB approved a waiver of informed consent but
required a deception notice to be sent after study
completion. Therefore, we sent subjects a debriefing
email to explain that the simulated phishing emails
were part of an experiment for research purposes
with no security risks that would make them
vulnerable to any threats. Users could indicate a
desire not to have their data used for the study.

4.1. Study population
Of the 6,938 participants in this study, 46% were
male and 54% were female. We excluded 17 people
who were involved with the design of the study and
11 who opted out of the study. The 27-41 year old
age group had the highest proportion of participants
(31%), while the youngest age group (less than 27
years old) had the smallest proportion (9.3%). The
proportions of technical faculty, other faculty, and
administrative staff were 15.5%, 45.1%, and 39.4%,
respectively. The most notable gender difference was
the much higher proportion of males than females
among technical faculty over age 59.

4.2. Data overview
We used Human Resource records for faculty and
staff to identify demographic factors, including age,
gender, position, and department type. Age groups
were defined so that there would be no singly
identifiable personnel using other demographic
information. We broke down the position factor into
adjunct faculty, full-time faculty, wages staff and
other staff. The department type is broken down into
administration, technical college, and other college.
Technical college includes employees in engineering
and
science;
remaining
non-administration
employees are categorized as other college.
To collect users’ click behavior reflecting their
susceptibility to phishing emails, we used an open
source phishing framework called Gophish [15],
intended to help organizations test their own
exposure to phishing. The Gophish application sent

simulated phishing emails, directed clickers to the
appropriate LP, and recorded the data.
Other data collected in this study included
technical data such as VPN and firewall logs; a precampaign survey on technical/cybersecurity-related
experience and psychological/behavioral/personality
factors; and a final survey, after the conclusion of the
phishing campaigns, asking more in-depth questions
about the phishing emails, reasons for clicking and/or
not clicking the email links, and the user’s usual
behavior when receiving or reacting to such emails.
Since here we are focused primarily on demographic
factors, the analysis and reporting on these
relationships are planned for a future publication.

4.3. Simulated phishing campaign
We designed three phishing emails in different
contexts with urgency cues to stimulate users to click
on a link:
• IT Helpdesk (IT). An IT helpdesk email notifies
the user that there had been suspicious activity
overnight, which caused the account to be
deactivated. The user is instructed to click a link
to review the activity and reactivate the account.
• Package Delivery (PD). A package delivery
service email is sent to users describing a failed
package delivery due to invalid postal code. The
user is instructed to click on the link to download
the shipping label that must be brought to the
post office to pick up the package.
• Credit Charge Warning (CC). An email
notifies users of a suspicious charge on a credit
card, for which large purchase notifications are
enabled. The user is asked to click a link to
review the charge and change notification
settings.
We purchased domain names for each of the
sender accounts. We purposefully assigned plausible
names that would be somewhat suspicious to careful
users. The domain name for the IT helpdesk email
was “support@masonhelpdesk.com” as opposed to
the actual university IT email account, and the
package delivery email was sent from the fictitious
“pkginfo@vapostal.com.” The credit card email was
sent from “service@acubank.co”, which has a “.co”
instead of a “.com” address.
The goal was to send each user all three emails.
However, there was a concern that if a user receives
all three emails or if all users received the same email
on the same day (or week), it would raise suspicion
about the emails and be less effective as a result. To
minimize potential suspicion and to counterbalance
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potentially confounding factors such as day of week
and order of receipt, we created nine user groups (A1,
A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, C1, C2, C3) using stratified
sampling to make sure each group has similar age,
gender, and department type composition. We sent
each group one email per week on a different day of
the week. This way, each group would receive all
three emails, but on a different day of each week
Table 1. Phishing campaign schedule

different LPs for the same email, we recorded the
“strongest” LP that was experienced.
Our LP research question may be described using
two hypotheses: 1) users who receive notification
about clicking on a phishing link would be less likely
to click on a future link, and 2) users who receive a
stronger notification (i.e., training video LP) would
be less likely to click on a future link than those who
received a simple message notification. To ensure a
sufficient sample size for the first hypothesis
mentioned above, we set the probability distribution
for simple message LP to be 25%, training video LP
to be 25%, and standard 404 LP to be 50%.

5. Results

(Table 1). In this paper, we consider week 1, week 2,
and week 3 as the sequence of three weeks.
The email campaigns were terminated on
November 21, giving each email at least a full week
to be opened and clicked by each user. We recorded
the operating system and time of the clicks so that we
could link the click behavior to IT data and identify
technical indicators that suggest susceptibility to
phishing. If a user made multiple clicks on an email,
we recorded the time of the first click.
To examine the impact of feedback given after
clicking on a phishing link, we varied the Landing
Page (LP) to which the user was redirected after
clicking the link. We were interested in any
differences in the impact of LP on subsequent
behavior (i.e., the likelihood of clicking on a
subsequent phishing email). Users who clicked on a
phishing link were redirected at random to one of
three LPs: (a) a standard 404 (“Page Not Found”)
error that does not notify the user that he or she has
clicked on a phishing link; (b) a webpage that
displays a simple message notifying the user that he
or she has clicked on a simulated phishing link from
the study; (c) a webpage that notifies the user that he
or she has clicked on a phishing link from the study,
explains the study, and provides a training video on
how to identify suspicious emails. Thus, the training
video provided the most educational feedback, and
the “Page Not Found” 404 message provided the
least informative feedback. For those who clicked on
the link multiple times, we used HTTP cookies to
implement a script that would ensure that they would
see the same LP each time, as long as they were
using the same device or browser. For the few users
who used different devices and therefore saw

The statistical methodologies applied in this study
are the Chi-square test for independence at
significance level α=0.05, Cramer’s V to test strength
of that significance, and multiple pairwise
comparisons for proportions with Bonferroni
correction. For the Chi-square test, the null
hypothesis is that there is no association between the
test variable and the clicking result. For the
proportions test, our null hypothesis is that there is no
difference between the test proportions.

5.1. Click behavior and landing page
5.1.1. Landing page analysis. We examined the LP
data to assess whether clickers learned from the LP to
be more alert when receiving the next simulated
phishing email. We conducted two types of LP
analysis to investigate our hypothesis: First we
checked to see if clickers who received a brief
message or a video LP from the first two weeks are
less likely to click on email link in the third week
(results shown in Table 2). For the second analysis,
we explored the effectiveness of the video LP by
comparing the click rates in the future week by
different LPs that people received from the first two
weeks (results shown in Table 3).
For the first analysis (Table 2), we considered
the strongest LP variable with three levels: 404 page,
brief message and video page, and no LP. No LP
indicates the user did not click the link in the email
from the previous week. This would mean they did
not see any LP. Although we hypothesized that users
may learn from the notification on the LP, we found
no statistically significant difference in the week 3
click rate between users who received the 404 LP
versus those who received some form of notification
(brief message or video) in previous weeks. On the
other hand, comparing the click rate for 404 (or
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combined message and video) with no LP, we found
a highly significant difference: clickers were more
likely to be repeat-clickers than non-clickers were to
become clickers (Table 3). In other words, previous
week non-clickers are significantly less likely to click
than previous week clickers.
The second LP analysis focused on the
effectiveness of the video. We found no significant
difference between click behavior across the
strongest LP variable with three levels, 404 page,
brief message, and video page (Table 3 and Table 4).
Specifically, the video LP did not contribute to a
lower click rate, contrary to our initial hypothesis.

who were successfully phished in the previous week
results in a population less susceptible to being
phished. Lack of a statistically significant decrease in
click rate among those who did click in a previous
week may reflect lack of an effect or insufficient
power/sample size.
Table 4. Multiple pairwise comparisons for proportions
with Bonferroni correction

5.1.2. Week-to-week click rate. In another analysis,
we observed a decreasing trend for the week-to-week
click rate. 719 users (10.4%) clicked on the week 1
simulated phishing email. 617 users (8.9%) clicked
on the week 2 email. 539 users (7.8%) clicked on the
week 3 email. However, the decreases in click rate
from one week to the next were significant only for
users who did not click in the previous week (Table
5). In other words, previous week non-clickers are
less likely to click than previous week clickers. We
hypothesize that this occurs because removing users
Table 2. Two types of landing page analysis
LP Analysis Type 1

W3 Clicked
W3 Did not click
Total
Click Rate
95%
Lower
Confidence
Bound
Interval for
Upper
Click Rate
Bound
(%)
LP Analysis Type 2
W3 Clicked
W3 Did not click
Click Rate
95%
Confidence
Interval for
Click Rate
(%)

Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound

Strongest Landing Page
404
Msg +
video
99
119
408
563
507
682
19.53%
17.45%
16.31
14.78
23.20

20.48

Table 5. Week-to-week click rate by LPs
No LP
321
5428
5749
5.58%
5.02
6.21

Strongest Landing Page
404
Msg
99
57
408
276
507
333
19.53%
17.12 %
16.31
13.45

Video
62
287
349
17.77%
14.11

23.20

22.12

21.53

Table 3. LP analysis: Result of Chi-square test for
independence
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5.2. Click behavior and email content
5,421 users (78.1%) did not click on any
simulated phishing emails. 1,517 users (21.7%)
clicked at least one email. 1,192 users (17.2%)
clicked on only one email, 268 users (3.9%) clicked
on two emails, 57 users (0.8%) clicked on all three.
Of the 1,517 users who clicked on at least one email,
424 (6.11% of all users) clicked the CC email, 826
(11.91% of all users) clicked the IT email and 649
(9.35% of all users) clicked the PD email (Table 6).
There is a significant difference between the click
rates for any two emails. As we hypothesized, the IT
help desk email tricked the largest proportion of
users, followed by the package.
Table 6. Click behavior by email type

5.3. Demographic variables
We examined click rates for each demographic
category directly. Figures 1 and 2 show 95%
confidence intervals for click rate by demographic
(age and gender) and employment (department type

Figure 1. Click rate and 95% confidence interval by
demographic factors

and position) factors.
The Chi-squared test shows a significant
relationship between age or position and click
behavior (Table 7). Table 4 shows that people over
59 years old are more likely to fall for phishing but
contrary to our initial hypothesis, we did not find that
people in the youngest age group were significantly
more likely to fall for the phishing emails.
We found adjunct faculty are significantly more
susceptible to phishing than full-time faculty and
wages staff, and marginally more likely to click than
other staff at significance level 0.05 (Table 4), which
may be explained by that a higher proportion of older
people (29.5%) is identified in adjunct faculty than
other job categories (full-time: 24.5%; other: 14.5%;
wages: 16.6%). Wages staff are significantly less
likely to be phished than people in other positions.
We found there is a marginally significant association
between gender and phishing susceptibility at
significance level 0.05 (Table 7).
Males had a slightly higher click rate. Since the
sample size is large, the Cramer’s V values show a
relatively weak relationship between the click
behavior and each demographic variable, but the
differences are statistically significant. There is no
statistically
significant
association
between
department type and phishing susceptibility. We
found no evidence indicating that employees from
technical colleges are less likely to fall for phishing
than from other departments.

5.4. Demographic variables and email content
To investigate the relationship between demographic
variables and email content, we analyzed the users
who clicked on each type of phishing link. Figs. 3
and 4 show click rates and 95% confidence intervals
for each type of email content by demographic and
employment factors. Among the clickers, we
observed that males are more likely to click on the
credit card email than females. Pairwise comparison
of proportions (Table 4) suggests users in the oldest
group (above 59 years old) are more likely to click on
Table 7. Demographic variables analysis: Result of
Chi-square test for independence

Figure 2. Click rate and 95% confidence interval by
employment factors
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Figure 3. Click rate and 95% confidence interval for each email content by demographic factors

Figure 4. Click rate and 95% confidence interval for each email content by employment factors

the credit card email than people aged 27 to 59.
Users in the youngest age group (less than 27
years old) are significantly more likely to click on the
credit card email than people aged between 27 and 41.
Our analysis also suggests users in the oldest age
group are significantly more likely to fall for IT help
desk email and package delivery email than other
groups. Our analysis shows that adjunct faculty are
significantly more likely to click on the credit card
email than the full-time faculty and wages staff.
Adjunct faculty are significantly more susceptible to
the IT help desk email than people in other positions.
Full-time faculty are more likely to click on the
package delivery email than wages staff. We found
no other differences that were statistically significant.
There is no significant difference in proportion of
people who clicked on a particular email by
department type.

5.5. Multi-level model
Univariate and bivariate analyses have the
potential for confounds. For example, in samples
where males tend to be younger, the univariate effect
of age may be caused by gender differences (or vice
versa). Multivariate statistics can separate the effect of
variables when entered into the same model. Another
potential confound for the univariate statistical
analysis used in this study is the effect of time.
Extending our hypothetical example, if young male
staff happen to respond to email more quickly than
older female faculty, and if responding quickly is
related to phishing susceptibility, then a univariate
effect for age, gender, or position would actually be
explained by time (response latency). We conducted a
separate analysis of the factors examined in this study
using a multi-level logit model including all variables
simultaneously to better isolate the effects of these
factors. Using this approach, the effects of time, age,
gender, position, and LP are estimated for each of the
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email types (Table 8). Two conclusions are consistent
across email type: university employees are less likely
to click as time passes and those who have clicked
before are more likely to click again. This second
finding is consistent with univariate results. The effect
of age does seem to vary by email type (as in the
bivariate statistics), such that the over 59 year old age
group tend to be more susceptible to the IT email,
whereas the youngest age group seems to be more
susceptible to the banking email. The effect of gender
(male susceptibility) does seem to be independent
from the effect of age for the banking email, where
the other email types have no significant gender
effects. Adjunct faculty seem to have a significant
susceptibility to the IT email with the added effect of
adjunct faculty and other staff having somewhat
higher susceptibility to the banking email. Finally, the
feedback intervention was only successful for the
banking email: those who saw a LP were less likely to
click again than those having seen a 404 error.
Table 8. Fixed effects for a multi-level logit model
predicting susceptibility for three email types.
(Intercept)
Time
27-41
41-49
49-59
59+
Female
Full-time
Other
Wage
Prior click
Message
Video

IT
-5.90***
-0.08***
-0.16
-0.06
-0.15
0.28*
0.06
-0.46***
-0.38***
-0.50***
1.06***
-0.26
0.05

PD
-6.53***
-0.09***
-0.36*
-0.37*
-0.15
0.30†
-0.06
0.15
0.07
-0.21
1.16***
0.02
-0.04

CC
-6.61***
-0.09***
-0.52**
-0.51*
-0.33†
-0.04
-0.21*
-0.34*
-0.05
-0.40*
1.32***
0.09
-0.78**

These results further aid interpretation of findings
regarding demographic variables predictive of
phishing susceptibility. Statistical control supported
the independent effect of age, position, and gender
though these effects depended on email type. The
analysis further supported the effect of the video
feedback intervention for certain email types.

6. Discussion
The best predictor of phishing susceptibility may
be having been phished before. Individuals who
clicked on a previous week’s email are significantly
more likely than non-clickers to click on the next
week’s email. Contrary to our initial hypothesis, we
found varied effects of LP on subsequent week
behavior. It is possible that those most susceptible to
phishing are also those unlikely to patiently
read/view feedback. The positive finding for the
banking email may reflect that any feedback effect
may only apply to high stakes scenarios (i.e., falling

for a banking scam [fiscal damage] is likely more
impactful than an IT scam [computer damage]). This
should be investigated in the future.
There was a statistically significant association
between age or position and phishing susceptibility.
Department type is not significantly related to
phishing susceptibility. The effect of gender was less
consistent with previous literature. We found that
gender is a small significant factor, which contradicts
the result in Mohebzada et al. [11] and Diaz et al. [1],
although they found a non-significant higher rate for
males. Additionally, even though Jagatic et al. [9],
Sheng et al. [13], and Halevi et al. [8] indicated that
gender is a significant factor in phishing
susceptibility, the direction of our result is
inconsistent with their results claiming that females
are more likely to click [8][9][13]. Furthermore,
considering the gender click behavior by each email
content, our result shows that males are significantly
more likely to click on the financial email than
females. Individuals in the youngest age group (less
than 27 years old) are significantly more likely to
click on the financial email than people aged between
27 and 41. Those in the oldest age group (greater than
59 years old) are significantly more likely to click on
the financial email than people aged 27 to 59, and
moreover, they are more likely to fall for IT help
desk email and package delivery email than other
groups. Our findings suggest that people over 59
years old may be the most vulnerable group to all
three phishing email content types.
There were more clickers on the IT help desk
email than the other two emails. This result may
suggest that university employees pay more attention
to emails related to their work context, which is
consistent with findings from Greene et al. [5]. The
financial email fooled the smallest proportion of
users, which may suggest that people are more alert
to the emails that come from an unfamiliar bank that
they were not enrolled. As the domain name of the
financial email ended by “.co” instead of “.com”, this
may also explain the smaller proportion of users who
were deceived by the financial content. The urgency
cues [10] in the three emails might triggered users to
believe they are genuine emails. This phenomenon
will be investigated in our post-experiment survey.
Our study design had several important aspects
that help to disambiguate results of previous studies
and clarify implications for IT policy and practice:
(a) Varying phishing email types. We used three
types of simulated phishing emails (one related to
IT/tech support, one related to finance/banking, and
one related to e-commerce/package delivery) to
increase the generality of findings and assess any
differences in vulnerability to different types of email
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phishing exploits. (b) Stratified sampling of users.
Users were grouped by stratified sampling to ensure
each user would receive all emails but in different
days in three weeks, to reduce influence of possible
confounding factors. (c) Large-scale study. This
study used a large number of subjects and a wide age
range of users, enabling us to disambiguate some of
the discrepant findings previously reported on
demographic factors.
Some possible limitations of this study should be
considered in planning future research. While the
multivariate statistical models allowed variables to be
tested while controlling for all other variables, it is
still possible that unmeasured variables may be the
underlying cause of some the relationships. First, for
the clickers who received the message or the video
LP in the previous week, we did not evaluate how
carefully they read the message or watched the
embedded anti-phishing training video. In the poststudy survey, we asked if people watched the video
and found that click behavior has no significant
relationship with whether people viewed the video
(although this result is restricted to survey
respondents). A second limitation is that the results
related to the email content analysis are restricted to
the specific email designs that we used; since we
didn’t include multiple versions of each type, it
would be risky to generalize these results.

7. Future work
Future research should explore the effect of email
type on phishing susceptibility; and plans also
include analysis of other behavioral factors that were
collected in this study but not yet examined.
Understanding these factors and characteristics will
enable development of IT policies and practices,
better defensive software tools, and more effective,
perhaps tailored, awareness training for the most
susceptible users.
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